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Astrid Epiney 
 
Dieser Beitrag (Stand 2012) wurde erstmals wie folgt veröffentlicht:  
Astrid Epiney, The Role of International Environmental Standards within the EU, in: Mauro 
Bussani/Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (Hrsg.), Comparisons in Legal Development. The Impact of 
Foreign and International Law on National Legal Systems, Zürich 2016, 73-98. Es ist möglich, dass diese 
publizierte Version – die allein zitierfähig ist – im Verhältnis zu diesem Manuskript geringfügige 
Modifikationen enthält.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The European Union is an important actor at the international level (also) in relation to 
environmental matters. So, the EU is a party to numerous international treaties, normally 
alongside its Member States, as the conditions for an exclusive EU competence are generally 
not met in connection with environmental topics. Thus, international treaties concluded by the 
EU in this area are, in the main, mixed agreements.1  
 
The European Union frequently adopts secondary legislation either prior or subsequent to its 
ratification of environmental agreements in order to ensure – at the EU level – conformity 
with international law. This process means that international standards are in some sense 
transposed into EU law. Not all provisions of international treaties are subject to such a 
transposition; for a variety of reasons, some conventional dispositions are not taken up in 
secondary legislation. This situation does not alter the fact that those treaty provisions form an 
integral part of the applicable law within the framework of the European Union as the Union 
has far reaching competences in the field of environmental policy-making and the provisions 
of mixed agreements become integral components of EU law if the European Union has an 
external competence to conclude treaties on the relevant topic.2 The gaps in the process of 
transposition at the EU level, however, give rise to questions concerning whether and under 
                                                 
  I would like to thank Joanna Bourke Martignoni for her help as linguistic aspects are concerned.  
1  Cf. as to the competence of the EU to conclude international treaties in environmental matters and the 
relationship to the competences of the Member States, a topic which is not the subject of the present 
contribution, e.g. Dominik Thieme, European Community External Relations in the Field of the 
Environment, EELR 2001, 252 et seq.; Cornelia Eberle, Die EG als Partei internationaler 
Umweltschutzübereinkommen: Fragen des Abschlusses von Übereinkommen und deren 
Implementierung, 2001; Teresa Fajardo Del Castillo, Revisiting the External Dimension of the 
Environmental Policy of the European Union: Some Challenges Ahead, JEEPL 2010, 365 et seq.; as to 
the external competences of the EU in general e.g. Paul Craig/Grainne de Burca, EU Law. Text, Cases 
and Materials, fifth edition, 2011, p. 303 et seq.; as to the specific problems raised by mixed agreements 
in the area of environmental protection e.g. Johanna Steyrer, Gemischte Verträge im Umweltrecht – die 
Folgen geteilter Kompetenz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten ZUR 2005, 343 et 
seq.  
2  Cf. the references in note 1. 
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which conditions the provisions of international treaties may have legal consequences within 
the framework of the EU and its Member States.  
 
The aim of the present contribution is to analyse these questions, first (II.) by providing a 
general overview of the effects of international (environmental) law within the legal system of 
the EU, second (III.) by illustrating and exploring some of the problems related to these issues 
using three recent ECJ judgments concerning the Aarhus Convention in connection with 
access to information, participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental 
matters.3 The same Convention will also be referred to as an example in Part II. The 
contribution concludes with some remarks on the effectiveness of international environmental 
law within the framework of the European Union (IV.).  
 
The Aarhus Convention contains three main elements (“pillars”):4  
- The first pillar provides for access to environmental information held by public authorities: individuals 
and NGOs are guaranteed access without any additional conditions (as far as their possible interests are 
concerned). This right can only be restricted for certain reasons enumerated exhaustively in the 
Convention.  
- The second pillar concerns public participation in decision-making in environmental matters: the public 
shall have a right to participate (which includes information and comments) on certain activities that are 
particularly relevant to the environment listed in Annex I (essentially authorisations concerning large 
projects normally also subject to an EIA).  
- Finally, the third pillar provides for access to justice in connection with the possible violation of the 
principles of access to environmental information (Article 9(1)), the legality of decisions about certain 
activities particularly relevant for the environment (annexe I) and compliance with national environmental 
laws. 
 
 
II. International Environmental Law and the EU legal framework – Overview  
 
As soon as an international agreement enters into force for the European Union, it becomes an 
“integral part” of EU law.5 According to Article 216(2) TFEU those agreements are binding 
                                                 
3  Which is ratified by the EU and all Member States. Cf. the text of the agreement in ILM 38 (1999), 517 et 
seq., OJ 2005 L 124, 1 (annex to the decision of the EU to adhere to the Convention). 
4  Cf. in detail to the Aarhus Convention e.g. Astrid Epiney, UN/ECE-Konvention über den Zugang zu 
Informationen, die Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung an Entscheidungsverfahren und den Zugang zu Gerichten in 
Umweltangelegenheiten („Aarhus-Konvention“), Kommentar, in: Fluck/Theuer (Hrsg.), 
Informationsfreiheitsrecht mit Umweltinformations- und Verbraucherinformationsrecht IF-R/UIG, 
Kommentar, F II.1, 2003; Astrid Epiney/Martin Scheyli, Die Aarhus-Konvention. Rechtliche Tragweite 
und Implikationen für das schweizerische Recht, 2000; Martin Scheyli, Aarhus-Konvention über 
Informationszugang, Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung und Rechtsschutz in Umweltbelangen, ArchVR 2000, 
217 et seq.; Michael Zschiesche, Die Aarhus-Konvention – mehr Bürgerbeteiligung durch 
umweltrechtliche Standards?, ZUR 2001, 177 et seq.; Petra Jeder, Neue Entwicklungen im Umweltrecht 
vor dem Hintergrund der Aarhus-Konvention, Jahrbuch des Umwelt- und Technikrechts (UTR) 2002, 145 
et seq.; Vera Rodenhoff, The Aarhus-Convention and its Implications for the „Institutions“ of the 
European Community, RECIEL 2002, 343 et seq.; Sabine Schlacke, Überindividueller Rechtsschutz, 
2008, 232 et seq.; Alexander Schink, Die Aarhus-Konvention und das deutsche Umweltrecht, EurUP 
2003, 27 et seq.; Thomas von Danwitz, Aarhus-Konvention: Umweltinformation, 
Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung, Zugang zu den Gerichten, NVwZ 2004, 272 et seq.; Jerzy Jendroska, Aarhus 
Convention and Community Law. The Interplay, JEEPL 2005, 12 et seq.; Marc Eric Butt, Die 
Ausweitung des Rechts auf Umweltinformation durch die Aarhus-Konvention, 2001. 
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on the institutions of the EU and its Member States. These effects raise the question of their 
precise legal consequences and meanings. In the context of the present contribution, six issues 
are of particular importance: the (potential) duty to transpose the provisions of an 
international agreement (1.), the obligations of Member States to transpose (2.), the manner of 
transposition (3.), the interpretation of the international agreements and the provisions of EU 
law concerning transposition of their principles (4.), the primacy of international agreements 
(5.) and, finally, the possible direct effect of provisions of international agreements (6.). These 
issues are of course also of general interest in the area of external relations law of the 
European Union; however, some or parts of them are particularly relevant in the areas of 
international and European environmental law, which is characterised by a certain lack of 
implementation and enforcement.  
 
 
1. As to the duty of transposition of provisions of international agreements at the EU level 
 
As mentioned above,6 international environmental agreements concluded by the EU are, in 
general, mixed agreements. This means that at the international level, the EU and its Member 
States are, in principle, bound by the whole agreement, unless – and this is generally not the 
case with respect to international environmental agreements – it can be affirmed without any 
doubt that solely the Member States or only the EU are responsible or competent to fulfil 
certain obligations.7  
At the EU level, however, the question arises as to the circumstances in which there may be a 
legal obligation – grounded in EU law – to transpose the provisions of international 
environmental agreements into the framework of the European Union. Such an obligation 
could be derived from Article 216(2) TFEU according to which international agreements are 
binding on the institutions of the EU and its Member States and from the characterisation, by 
the ECJ, of international agreements as forming an integral part of EU law.8  
There is a clear obligation for the Union to transpose those international legal obligations that 
must be realised at the EU level. Indeed, in such a situation, only a transposition at the EU 
level can ensure that it meets its international obligations. Thus, the EU is obliged – through 
an application of Article 216(2) TFEU – to adopt the secondary acts necessary to fulfil its 
international obligations. One example of such a transposition are the provisions of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
5  Cf. already ECJ, case 181/73, Haegemann, ECR 1974, 449, para. 2/6; see also ECJ, case 104/81, 
Kupferberg, ECR 1982, 3641, para. 13; ECJ, case 12/86, Demirel, ECR 1987, 3641, para. 7; ECJ, case C-
192/89, Sevince, ECR 1990, I-3461, para. 8; ECJ, case C-386/08, Brita, judgment of 25/2/2010.   
6  Cf. I. 
7  In detail, this issue raises a number of complex questions which cannot be dealt with in the present 
contribution. Cf. to this issue, with further references, Astrid Epiney, Zu den Implikationen der EU-
Mitgliedschaft für die Stellung und Anwendung des Völkerrechts im innerstaatlichen Bereich, FS Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, 2012, 1909 (1915 et seq.).  
8  Cf. already note 5. 
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Aarhus Convention as far as access to environmental information in the possession of EU 
institutions is concerned - it is up to the European Union to adopt the measures necessary to 
fulfil these obligations. The same is true for the guarantee of judicial review at the EU level.  
On the other hand, however, it is apparent that there is no obligation for the EU to legislate in 
order to comply with international agreements in matters over which the EU itself has no 
competence. Again, using the example of the Aarhus Convention, this is the case in relation to 
judicial review in Member States of those national environmental laws that do not constitute 
an application, a transposition or an implementation of EU law. The competence of the EU, 
under the terms of Art. 192 TFEU, is restricted to the adoption of measures concerning 
judicial review of EU law or national law applying or implementing EU law.9  
The situation is less clear cut at the Member State level, e.g. – with reference to the Aarhus 
Convention – when access to information held by authorities within Member States, public 
participation in decision-making in environmental matters at the national level or judicial 
review in Member States is concerned. While the EU may also adopt secondary legislation 
that imposes obligations on Member States in these situations (since the competence of the 
EU in environmental matters is relatively wide-ranging),10 there may be no legal duty for the 
EU to do so. In this context, one may also highlight that in circumstances in which the 
Member States are parties to a Convention even if the European Union does not act, the States 
are still required to adopt the necessary legislative measures in order to comply with their 
international obligations. However, this conclusion does not consider all issues and aspects of 
the questions raised: In cases where the European Union itself adopts or has previously 
enacted legislative measures in the field covered by an international obligation, it can be 
argued that there is a legal obligation – which can be derived from Article 216(2) TFEU – to 
adapt this legislation to the international obligation. Indeed, in these situations, the EU acts in 
a field covered by an international obligation and it therefore must respect the applicable 
provisions of the international instrument and also consider its constituent elements at the EU 
level. It is argued here that this obligation is only fulfilled if the secondary act takes over the 
relevant elements of the international obligation. The obligation will not be discharged 
through a simple assertion that the secondary act does not prevent the Member States from 
                                                 
9  Cf. to this latter issue in detail already Astrid Epiney, Gemeinschaftsrecht und Verbandsklage, NVwZ 
1999, 485 (491-492). Cf. in the same direction Christoph Meitz, Entscheidung des EuGH zum deutschen 
Umweltrechtsbehelfsgesetz, NuR 2011, 420 (421); Markus Appel, Umweltverbände im Ferrari des 
deutschen Umweltrechtsschutzes – Anmerkung zur Trianel-Entscheidung des EuGH, NuR 2011, 414 
(415); Martin Gellermann, Europäisierte Klagerechte anerkannter Umweltverbände, NVwZ 2006, 7 (9); 
Bernhard Wegener, Anmerkung zu den Schlussanträgen der Generalanwältin Sharpston, ZUR 2011, 84; 
Angela Schwerdtfeger, Der deutsche Verwaltungsrechtsschutz unter dem Einfluss der Aarhus-
Konvention, 2010, 298-299; of another opinion, however, Felix Ekardt, Die nationale Klagebefugnis nach 
der Aarhus-Konvention, NVwZ 2006, 55; Ingolf Pernice/Vera Rodenhoff, Die Gemeinschaftskompetenz 
für eine Richtlinie über den Zugang zu Gerichten in Umweltangelegenheiten, ZUR 2004, 149 (150-151).   
10  Cf. to his issue e.g., with further references, Astrid Epiney, Umweltrecht in der EU, 2th edition, 2005, 56 
et seq.; Jan H. Jans/Hans H.B. Vedder, European Environmental Law After Lisbon, 4 th edition, 2012, 59 
et seq.; Ludwig Krämer, Droit de l’environnement de l’Union européenne, 2011, 35 et seq. 
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transposing EU legislation in conformity with the relevant international agreement by 
legislating on additional elements. Article 216(2) TFEU clearly states that agreements are 
binding on the institutions of the EU, this must also mean that the EU itself – at least when 
legislating – is required to consider the totality of its international obligations. Otherwise, 
there would be the risk of Member States transposing secondary acts in total conformity with 
the relevant EU secondary act without considering the international obligations that underlie 
them. Over and above this, only this approach may assure the effectiveness of international 
obligations. It can therefore be affirmed that the EU is legally bound to formulate secondary 
acts in such a way that ensures compliance with international obligations when legislating in 
the relevant field. Again, using examples drawn from the Aarhus Convention, if the EU has 
previously adopted or decides to enact a directive on access to environmental information 
held by national authorities, it must formulate the directive in conformity with the Aarhus 
Convention in such a way that it also obliges the Member States to comply with the intent 
underlying the Convention provisions. When legislating on the authorisation procedure for 
administrative decisions falling within the scope of the second pillar of the Aarhus 
Convention (concerning public participation in decision-making in environmental matters), 
the secondary act has to encompass the relevant provisions of the Aarhus Convention as well 
as the general obligations referring to judicial review of such decisions (cf. Article 9(2) 
Aarhus Convention).  
Over and above this, there are strong arguments to support the view that there is also a legal 
obligation of the EU to transpose international obligations when an EU action seems to be the 
only effective means to achieve the desired outcome (contingent, of course, on the possession 
of EU competence). The precise conditions giving rise to the finding of such obligations will 
depend upon a number of different factors. The leitmotiv must be effectiveness: if a 
legislative act on the EU level appears to be the only way to ensure the effective application 
of and compliance with the international obligation, the binding effect of international 
agreements implies that the Union is under a legal duty to legislate at the EU level.  
 
 
2. Obligations of Member States  
 
In cases where the EU has not (yet) adopted secondary legislation in the field covered by an 
international environmental agreement, the Member States are obliged under EU law (and not 
only on the basis of their international obligations) to adopt measures necessary to implement 
the international agreement (if, at is the case in environmental matters, the provisions of the 
international agreements fall within the scope of EU competence).11   
 
                                                 
11  Cf. ECJ, case C-239/03, Commission/France, ECJ 2004, I-9325, para 25, 26. 
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3. Manner of transposition on the EU level 
 
The manner in which provisions of international agreements are transposed into EU law may 
differ. From a legal point of view, however, the transposition has to be able to ensure 
conformity with international obligations.  
The form taken by the transposition will be dependent on the content and scope of the 
international provision and either directives or regulations may fulfil this condition. For 
example, the right of access to environmental information has been transposed at the EU level 
by a regulation12, while a directive13 has been used to cover the issue of access to information 
held by national authorities. 
As to the content of such transposition, it may of course differ depending on the international 
provision to be transposed. At times, it may be necessary to further specify the wording of a 
provision in an international agreement to enable it to be accurately reproduced in an EU 
secondary act while, at others, a complete transposition is used. So, e.g., article 10a Directive 
85/33714 reproduces more or less literally Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention.  
 
 
4. Interpretation  
 
As far as issues of interpretation are concerned, at least three clusters may be identified: 
- First, in connection with the interpretation of the international agreement itself, the 
principles of international law – and not the specific principles of EU law – have to be 
applied. The fact that the international agreement becomes an integral part of EU law 
does not mean that its character changes; it remains international law which applies as 
such in the framework of the EU.15 
                                                 
12  Regulation 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to 
Community institutions and bodies, OJ 2006 L 264, 13. This Regulation has to be seen and applied in 
relationship with Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents, OJ 2001 L 145, 43. 
13  Directive 2003/4 on public access to environmental information and repealing Directive 90/313, OJ 2003 
L 41, 26.  
14  Directive 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment, OJ 1985 L 175, 40. 
15  Cf. ECJ, case 270/80, Polydor, ECR 1982, 329, para 18 et seq. Cf. in detail to the interpretation of 
international agreements concluded by the EU, with further references, Astrid Epiney/Andreas Felder, 
Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum und Europäische Gemeinschaft: Parallelen und Divergenzen in 
Rechtsordnung und Auslegung, ZVglRWiss. 2001, 425 et seq.; Roland Bieber, Die Bedeutung der 
Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union für die Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge, 
in: Astrid Epiney/Beate Metz/Robert Mosters (eds.), Das Personenfreizügigkeitsabkommen Schweiz – 
EU: Auslegung und Anwendung in der Praxis / L’accord sur la libre circulation des personnes Suisse – 
UE: interprétation et application dans la pratique, 2011, 1 et seq. 
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- Second, the interpretation of secondary legislation transposing provisions of 
international agreements must on the one side refer to specific EU principles. On the 
other side, the fact that the secondary provision aims at the transposition of an 
international obligation needs to be taken into account. The interpretation therefore must 
consider the meaning of the relevant international provision and adopt a reasoning that 
conforms with it.16 
- Finally, the interpretation of EU law and national law must comply with the terms of 
international agreements. This obligation implies also a careful examination of the 
relevance of international agreements for the interpretation of EU or national law. The 
case law of the General Court is not always convincing in this respect. In T-366/03,17 
the conformity of an Austrian measure providing for an area free from genetically 
modified organisms with EU legislation had to be examined. The question in this 
context was also if the Alpine environment in Austria had special characteristics that 
would justify specific measures of protection as far as genetically modified plants and 
animals are concerned. The Court answered this question in the negative, without, 
however, considering the Alpine Convention18 which explicitly mentions that the alpine 
environment constitutes an “outstanding unique and diverse habitat” and demands 
measures that take into account “variety, uniqueness and beauty of nature and the 
countryside” in order to preserve this area on a permanent basis (preamble and Article 2 
Alpine Convention). 
 
 
5. Primacy of international agreements 
 
According to Article 216(2) TFEU, international agreements are binding upon the EU 
institutions and Member States.  
The supremacy of EU law applies, in principle,19 to binding agreements concluded by the EU 
and international law is binding on the Member States in the same way as primary and 
secondary law.  
As far as the relationship between international agreements and secondary legislation is 
concerned, the agreements prevail over secondary legislation.20 So, secondary legislation that 
does not conform to an international agreement may not be applied. The General Court has 
not always correctly applied this principle in its rulings on environmental matters:21 in the 
                                                 
16  Cf. e.g. ECJ, case C-548/09 P, Bank Melli Iran/Rat, judgment of 16 november 2011. 
17  General Court, joined Cases T-366/03 and T-235/05, Land Oberösterreich and Austria/Commission, ECR 
2005, II-4005.  
18  Ratified by the EU, cf. Decision 96/191, JO 1996 L 61, 31.  
19  As far as the treaty provision lies within the competence of the EU. Cf. as to the specific problems of 
mixed agreements the references in note 1. 
20  See e.g. ECJ, case C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, ECR 2006, I-403, para 35.  
21  Cf. to the following remarks Ludwig Krämer, Comment on Case T-362/08, JEEPL 2011, 225 et seq.  
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case T-362/0822, the Court applied Article 4(1.a) R 1049/200123 which allows access to a 
document to be refused if the disclosure could undermine protection of the economic policy 
of a Member State. The Court therefore maintained the Commission’s refusal of access to a 
letter from the former German Chancellor Schröder concerning the construction of an airport 
in a Natura 2000 area. The Aarhus Convention, however, does not provide for such an 
exception to the disclosure of environmental information. Therefore, the General Court should 
not have applied this provision of R 1049/2001; furthermore, Article 2(6) of that Regulation 
clearly states that the Regulation shall be without prejudice to rights of public access to 
documents held by the institutions which might follow from instruments of international law.   
 
 
6. Direct effect 
 
As already mentioned, international treaties are, as such, an integral part of the EU legal 
order, the consequence being that they are – while being interpreted using international legal 
methods of interpretation24 – binding for the Member States and the institutions as “normal” 
EU law. This implies, in particular, that EU law principles such as the (possibility) of direct 
effect (but also the supremacy of EU law already mentioned25) are applicable.  
Member States are thus obliged to apply the agreements when they enter into force at the 
international level. Member States cannot invoke, against such an applicability of 
international treaties binding for the EU, their internal legal order, which may exclude the 
direct effect of international treaties. On the contrary, in applying principles of EU law, 
provisions of international treaties can in principle also have a direct effect in Member States. 
Individuals may, therefore, under certain conditions, invoke provisions of international 
agreements in order to derive individual rights and the authorities in the Member States are, 
under certain conditions, obliged to apply provisions of international agreements.  
However, the question of when international provisions may have such a direct effect has to 
be answered not through the simple “automatic” application of the principles relevant in this 
respect for EU law provisions. Given that international treaty law applies as such and does not 
lose its character as international law, the question of which conditions a provision must fulfil 
in order to have direct effect must be answered by taking into consideration the particularities 
of the international treaty.26 According to the case law of the ECJ, the direct effect of 
                                                 
22  General Court, case T-362/08, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds, judgment of 13 january 2011.  
23  Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, OJ 2001 L 145, 43. 
24  Cf. II.4. 
25  Cf. II.5. 
26  Cf. the relevant case law: ECJ, case 104/81, Kupferberg, ECR 1982, 2641; ECJ, case 12/86, Demirel, 
ECR 1987, 3747; ECJ, case C-432/92, Anastasiou, ECR 1994, I-3116; ECJ, case C-162/96, Racke, ECR 
1998, I-3688; ECJ, case C-63/99, Gloszczuk, ECR 2001, I-6369, para. 38; ECJ, case C-235/99, Kondova, 
ECR 2001, I-6427, para. 33; ECJ, case C-192/89, Sevince, ECR 1990, I-3461; ECJ, case C-265/03, 
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provisions of international agreements may be admitted if the provision is unconditional, 
sufficiently precise, and if its direct application falls within the purpose and the nature of the 
agreement.27 
As far as international environmental law agreements are concerned, this aspect seems to be 
of a certain importance despite the fact that the direct effect of such agreements has not been 
frequently invoked in Member States:  
- Authorities in Member States must apply – even independently of individual rights – 
provisions of international environmental agreements if the specific conditions 
mentioned above are fulfilled, and this is also true in cases where the EU and/or the 
Member State have not transposed the agreement into secondary or national law. This 
obligation is a real EU law obligation since the principle of direct effect can be deduced 
both from EU law principles and from the characterisation of international agreements 
as an integral part of EU law.  
- Furthermore, individuals may invoke (and enforce) directly applicable provisions of 
international environmental agreements under the conditions mentioned above if those 
provisions confer individual rights. The question if this latter condition is fulfilled must 
be answered on the basis of the relevant principles of EU law. According to these 
principles, an individual may invoke a provision if it aims at protecting an individual 
interest (such as health protection) and if the individual is or may be concerned.28 
Despite the fact that most international environmental agreements contain rather broadly 
formulated provisions, which do not fulfil the requirements of being unconditional and 
sufficiently precise, there are, however, some cases in which the conditions may be met, e.g. 
some provisions of the Aarhus Convention29, the ESPOO Convention30, the MARPOL 
Convention31, the Bern Convention32 or the Seveso Convention33.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Simutenkov, ECR 2005, I-2579. See in the literature e.g. Nanette A. Neuwahl, in Emiliou/O’Keeffe 
(eds.), The European Union and World Trade Law, 1996, p. 313 (317 et seq.); Eckart Klein, Zur 
Auslegung von völkerrechtlichen Verträgen der EG mit Drittstaaten, in A. Epiney/F. Rivière (eds.), 
Auslegung und Anwendung von „Integrationsverträgen“/Interprétation et application des traités 
d’intégration“, 2006, 1 (14 et seq.); Craig/De Burca (note 1), 344 et seq.  
27  Cf. already ECJ, case 104/81, Kupferberg, ECR 1982, 2641; cf. furthermore the references in note 26.  
28  Cf. ECJ, case C-361/88, Commission/Germany, ECR 1991, I-2567; ECJ, case C-58/89, 
Commission/Germany, ECR 1991, I-4983; ECJ, case C-237/07, Janecek, ECR. 2008, I-6221; cf. in detail 
to this issue Astrid Epiney, Primär- und Sekundärrechtsschutz im Öffentlichen Recht, VVDStRL 61 
(2002), 361 (386 et seq.). Cf. also more recently e.g. Christine Steinbeiß-Winkelmann, Europäisierung 
des Verwaltungsrechtsschutzes als Effektivitätsgewinn?, in: Wilfried Erbguth (ed.), 
Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in der Krise: vom Rechtsschutz zum Schutz der Verwaltung?, 2010, 117 (121 et 
seq.); Bernhard Wegener, Rechtsschutz im europäischen (Umwelt-) Recht. Richterrechtliche und 
sekundärrechtliche Bausteine und Fehlercodes unionaler Dogmatik, UTR 2008, 319 (323 et seq.); Silvia 
Pernice-Warnke, Effektiver Zugang zu Gericht. Die Klagebefugnis für Individualkläger und Verbände in 
Umweltangelegenheiten unter Reformdruck, 2009; Christian Klöver, Klagefähige 
Individualrechtspositionen im deutschen Umweltverwaltungsrecht und nach Maßgabe von 
Umweltrichtlinien der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 2005; Ulrich Baumgartner, Die Klagebefugnis nach 
deutschem Recht vor dem Hintergrund der Einwirkungen des Gemeinschaftsrechts, 2005; Thomas von 
Danwitz, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht, 2008, 511 et seq. 
29  Cf. III. 
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The principle of direct effect can be of particular importance in situations where the EU and / 
or the Member States have not sufficiently transposed provisions of international 
environmental agreements as the following example shows: In Cases C-213/0334 and C-
239/0335 the scope and effect of Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the Protocol for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based Sources36 was in question. The Court 
states that Article 6(1) of the Protocol sets the objective to “strictly limit” pollution by 
substances or sources listed in Annex II. The documents submitted to the Court clearly show 
that the inflow of a hydroelectric power station situated near the Etang de Berre was highly 
disproportionate in comparison to the volume of the pond and that France had not taken all 
appropriate measures to prevent, abate and combat heavy and prolonged pollution from a 
land-based source. Article 6(3) of the Procotol clearly, precisely and unconditionally lays 
down the obligation for Member States to subject discharges of the substances listed in Annex 
II to the issue, by the competent national authorities, of an authorisation taking due account of 
the provisions of Annex III. These considerations also apply to the interpretation of Article 
6(1) of the Protocol. These provisions were found to have direct effect so that every discharge 
of the substances listed in Annex II is subject to an authorisation and any interested party is 
entitled to rely on these provisions before national courts.  
This judgment illustrates that even provisions of international agreements that leave a certain 
margin of appreciation to Member States can have direct effect to that extent that a national 
court may find breaches of their core content and individuals may rely on their provisions 
before domestic jurisdictions. Furthermore, the judgement shows the broad interpretation of 
the scope of rights conferred by European Union law, since it seems sufficient that the 
provisions are aimed at addressing an individual interest and that such an interested individual 
seeks access to justice in order to engage them; these conditions were held to have been 
fulfilled in this case in relation to the discharge of dangerous substances into a lake.37  
 
 
III. The example of the Aarhus Convention – selected aspects 
 
The effects of international environmental law within the framework of the EU and of EU law 
must be examined in connection with every different environmental agreement, in light of the 
principles developed above. In the framework of the present contribution, it is not possible to 
                                                                                                                                                        
30  Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 25 of february 1991, ILM 
1991, 802 et seq. 
31  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1978).  
32  Convention on the conservation of European wildlife and natural habitats (1979), CETS no. 104.   
33  UNECE Convention on the transboundary effects of industrial accidents (1992), OJ 1998 L 326, 5. 
34  ECJ, case C-213/03, Etang de Berre, ECR 2004, I-7357. 
35  ECJ, case C-239/03, Commission/France, ECR 2004, I-9325.   
36  Cf. the original version in OJ 1983 L 67, 1; cf. the modifications in OJ 1999 L 322, 18.  
37  Cf. in detail to the topic the references in note 28. 
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deal with all or even most international environmental agreements. The legal effects of 
international environmental agreements are, therefore, illustrated using selected aspects – with 
a particular focus on judicial review – of the Aarhus Convention. This choice can be 
explained by the fact that all relevant principles dealt with above are also addressed within the 
Convention and that the ECJ has recently specified a certain number of elements in this 
respect. The following remarks draw on three rulings of the ECJ to highlight those aspects of 
the relationship between international, EU and Member State law dealt with in this 
contribution.38  
 
 
1. Case C-263/08 (Djurgarden-Lilla) 
 
In Case C-263/0839, the precise scope of Article 10a D 85/33740 - which takes over Article 
9(2) Aarhus Convention – was one of the main issues. According to this provision, Member 
States shall ensure access to a review procedure before a court or another independent and 
impartial body established by law for members of the public concerned having a sufficient 
interest, or, alternatively, maintaining the impairment of a right, where administrative 
procedural law of a Member State requires this as a precondition. This access must serve to 
challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to the 
public participation provisions of the Directive. Access to justice must thus be accorded 
against administrative decisions concerning projects for which an EIA must be conducted in 
application of the Directive. Article 25 D 2010/7541 contains a similar provision.   
Three aspects of the judgment are of particular importance in this context:  
- Access to justice for the public concerned must be accorded regardless of the role the 
public might have played in taking part in the procedure leading to the decision being 
challenged. Both procedures have to be distinguished and have different purposes. This 
approach by the Court implies that Member States may not instate a relationship 
between access to justice and participation in the (administrative) procedure leading to 
the decision challenged.  
- Furthermore, the Court distinguishes clearly between the access to justice of natural or 
legal persons on the one hand and non-governmental organisations which promote 
environmental protection on the other. For the latter, Article 10a D 85/337 requires, 
according to the Court, access to justice (on condition any requirements under national 
                                                 
38  Cf. as to this part of the contribution already and in a more detailed way Astrid Epiney, Rechtsprechung 
des EuGH zur Aarhus-Konvention und Implikationen für die Schweiz. Zugleich ein Beitrag zu den 
Vorgaben der Aarhus-Konvention in Bezug auf das Verbandsbeschwerderecht, AJP 2011, 1505 et seq. 
39  ECJ, case C-263/08, Djurgarden-Lilla, ECR 2009, I-9967.  
40  Cf. to this article already II.3. 
41  Directive 2010/75 on Industrial Emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control), OJ 2010 L 334, 
17.  
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law are met) since they have to be regarded either as having sufficient interest or as 
having a right, which is capable of being impaired by projects falling within the scope 
of the Directive. The Directive stipulates – as does the Aarhus Convention – an 
altruistic access to justice for environmental organisations.  
- Finally, the Court deals with the requirements of national law in respect of a non-
governmental oganisation that promotes environmental protection in order to have a 
right of appeal under the conditions set out above: The national rules must ensure a 
wide access to justice and may not endanger the effectiveness of the provisions of 
Directive 85/337 on judicial remedies. So, a national provision may require that an 
organisation has as its object the protection of nature and the environment. Also, the 
condition that such an organisation must have a minimum number of members may be 
relevant in order to ensure that it does in fact exist and that it is active. However, a 
minimum number of members of 2,000 persons would run counter to the objectives of 
Directive 85/337 and, in particular, the objective of facilitating judicial review of 
projects: Indeed, such a condition has as a consequence that local or regional 
environmental organisations would not be eligible to demand access to justice, thereby 
defeating one of the purposes of Directive 85/337 which also covers projects on a local 
or regional level.  
This approach by the Court implies that a system in which only those organisations 
active at the national level could be recognised as environmental organisations having 
access to justice is not compatible with Directive 85/337. Thus, criteria for the 
recognition of the associations must be formulated in such a way that local or regional 
associations are capable of fulfilling them. Furthermore, one may deduce from the 
judgment that the criteria formulated by national law may only serve to examine the 
‘seriousness’ of the associations, in terms of their real existence, the object of 
environmental protection and the duration of their activities. It would not be in 
accordance with the directive to ‘filter’ out organisations on the basis of other criteria.  
In the present context, it is of particular importance that the Court bases its findings on an 
interpretation of Article 10a D 85/337 that conforms with the object and purposes of the 
Aarhus Convention.  
 
 
2. Case C-115/09 (Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz) 
 
Case C-115/0942 also concerned the interpretation of Article 10a Directtive 85/337 and 
therefore of Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention in relation to access to justice by 
environmental organisations. In Germany, the Umweltrechtsbehelfsgesetz (UmwRG) enables 
                                                 
42  ECJ, case C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, judgment of 12 may 2011.  
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environmental associations to challenge administrative decisions but only if they refer to 
environmental provisions intended to protect the legal interests of individuals, an approach 
which has to be considered in light of the so called Schutznormtheorie which links access to 
justice to the legal interests of individuals so that this access is, in comparison to other 
possible systems, rather narrow.43 In the judgment of the Court, the compatibility of the 
transposition of EU law (and the Aarhus Convention) was the central question.  
The point of departure of the ECJ to the different questions submitted in this context was that 
Article 10a D 85/337 was introduced in the Directive in order to transpose the Aarhus 
Convention into EU law to enable the EU to ratify the Convention. Considering the objectives 
of the Aarhus Convention, the Court stated that it would be contrary to Article 10a D 85/337 
if environmental organisations were not allowed to rely on the impairment of rules of EU 
environmental law solely because those rules protect only public interests and not (also) 
individual interests. Another approach would deprive those organisations of the opportunity to 
verify compliance with the rules of that branch of law, which, for the most part, address the 
public interest and not merely the protection of the interests of individuals as such. The rules 
that can be challenged by environmental organisations include those of national law 
implementing EU environmental law and the rules of EU environmental law having direct 
effect. Since these provisions of D 85/337 are precise and not subject to other conditions they 
have direct effect. This latter aspect is of particular importance since the provision of the 
Umweltrechtsbehelfsgesetz may not be able to be interpreted in conformity to EU law as its 
wording may be held to be sufficiently clear.44  
This approach of the Court also implies that national courts must be able to examine the 
question if there is infringement of the rules that may be challenged on the basis of the 
interpretation of Article 10a D 85/337. The judgment is convincing:45 A limitation of the 
access to justice of environmental organisations to situations in which the legal interests of 
                                                 
43  Vgl. to this conception in relationship to environmental law and with further references Astrid 
Epiney/Kaspar Sollberger, Zugang zu Gerichten und gerichtliceh Kontrolle im Umweltrecht, 2002, 29 et 
seq.; cf. also in relationship with the relevant provision of the Umweltrechtsbehelfsgesetzes Appel, NuR 
2011 (note 9), 414, with further references.  
44  Cf. to this question Wegener, ZUR 2011 (note 9), 84 (85); Sabine Schlacke, Anmerkung, NVwZ 2011, 
804 (805). 
45  Cf. already the arguments in Epiney/Sollberger, Zugang zu Gerichten (note 50), 324 et seq.; 
Epiney/Sollberger, Verwaltungsgerichtlicher Rechtsschutz (note 46), 168 et seq.; Epiney, in: 
Fluck/Theuer, Informationsfreiheitsrecht (note 4), F II.1, 2003, Art. 9, Rn. 10 et seq.; in the same sens 
Hans-Joachim Koch, Die Verbandsklage im Umweltrecht, NVwZ 2007, 369 (376-377); Sabine Schlacke, 
§ 3. Rechtsbehelfe im Umweltrecht, in: Schlacke/Schrader/Bunge, Informationsrechte, 
Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung und Rechtsschutz im Umweltrecht. Aarhus-Handbuch, 2010, 421; Jan Ziekow, 
Von der Reanimation des Verfahrensrechts, NVwZ 2005, 263 (266-267); Liane Radespiel, 
Entwicklungen des Rechtsschutzes im Umweltrecht aufgrund völker- und europarechtlicher Vorgaben – 
insbesondere das Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz, EurUP 2007, 118 (122); Wegener, UTR 2008 (note 28), 
319 (339 et seq.); Gabriele Oestreich, Individualrechtsschutz im Umweltrecht nach dem Inkrafttreten der 
Aarhus-Konvention und dem Erlass der Aarhus-Richtlinie, Verw 2006, 29 et seq.; cf. in detail with 
further references also Schwerdtfeger, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz unter dem Einfluss der Aarhus-
Konvention (note 9), 266 et seq. 
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individuals are concerned would mean that the access to justice of environmental 
organisations included in Article 10a D 85/337 would lose its effet utile since it could never 
be larger than the access to justice of individuals. Moreover, the wording of Article 10a D 
85/337 and Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention clearly support this point of view.46  
However, at least three questions may be raised in relation to the findings of the Court:  
- First, the access to justice only has to be guaranteed under environmental law, a 
restriction which has its basis in the fact that the subject area of the Aarhus Convention 
is limited to environmental matters, the privilege of environmental organisations also 
being motivated by the fact that they are supposed to have special knowledge in the field 
of environmental law and politics.47 The Court, however, does not specify the conditions 
under which it will be determined whether a rule concerns environmental matters. In any 
case, secondary law which is adopted on the legal basis of Article 192 TFEU has to be 
considered as forming part of environmental law. Furthermore, since environmental 
objectives may also be of some importance when the EU adopts secondary legislation 
on the basis of other provisions of the Treaty (what is confirmed by Articles 11, 114(3) 
TFEU), it seems appropriate to consider all rules which – in one way or another – have 
environmental objectives as environmental rules in respect of which access to justice has 
to be guaranteed. An analysis of whether these conditions are fulfilled must be 
conducted on a case-by-case basis.  
- Second, the Court relies – as previously mentioned – on provisions of national law 
implementing EU law or on EU law having a direct effect: only those provisions must 
be challenged on the basis of Article 10a D 85/337, an approach which can be explained 
by the restricted competence of the EU in that the EU can only adopt provisions in the 
field of implementation if EU law is concerned.48 This raises the question of which 
criteria will be used to determine whether a provision implements EU law, considering 
the fact that very large parts of national environmental law are in one way or another 
influenced by EU law. In regard of the restricted competence of the EU, only those 
national provisions that also implement EU law (including general principles as 
environmental principles) may satisfy this condition. On the other hand, the fact that a 
national provision implements ‘more’ than the EU standard does not prevent the 
                                                 
46  The compatibility of the mentioned provision of the Umweltrechtsbehelfsgesetz was indeed discussed 
very controversely and a majority of authors was of the opinion that it does not respect EU law. Cf. e.g. 
Gellermann, NVwZ 2006 (note 9), 7-8; Schlacke, Überindividueller Rechtsschutz (note 4), 301; 
Schwerdtfeger, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz unter dem Einfluss der Aarhus-Konvention (note 9), 273 et seq. 
Of another opinion e.g. von Danwitz, NVwZ 2004 (note 4), 272 (278-279). Cf. to this discussion also 
Bernhard Wegener, European Right of Action for Environmental NGOs, JEEPL 2011, 315 (317-318).  
47  Cf. Schwerdtfeger, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz unter dem Einfluss der Aarhus-Konvention (note 9), 280-
281.  
48  Cf. the references in note 9.  
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simultaneous implementation of EU law.49 In practice, delimitation may, however, 
prove to be rather complex.50  
- The national legislator must decide if there are to be two different regimes, one for the 
access to justice in respect of the EU law or national law implementing EU law and 
another for access to justice only in respect of national law. Such a differentiation would 
not appear to be the most effective solution as it is unclear why access to justice should 
be broader in the first constellation than in the latter; furthermore, the substance of the 
law may be very similar in both cases. Finally, treating the two regimes in the same may 
avoid the inherent difficulties of delimitation mentioned above.51  
Finally, it has to be stressed that the judgment does not refer to the admissibility of national 
provisions that limit judicial control. Such provisions exist e.g. in Germany in relation to rules 
which have not been invoked in the administrative procedure leading to the decision being 
challenged or in respect of certain provisions that have a purely procedural character.52 When 
answering this question, the principle of the effet utile is usually decisive, as it has to be 
applied in respect of every national provision. However, the consideration of the Court in 
Case C-263/0853 supports the view that the distinction made in EU law between participation 
in the administrative procedure on the one side and access to justice on the other implies that 
access to justice may not be subordinated to prior participation in the administrative 
procedure.  
 
 
3. Case C-240/09 (Lesoochranarske) 
 
Case 240/0954 concerned Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention (access to justice in respect of 
the possible violation of national environmental law). In the Slovak case, an environmental 
association sought access to justice in relation to the authorisation, by the competent national 
authorities, of exceptions from the protection regime for certain listed species, in relation to 
entry to a protected area and in connection with the use of chemical substances in those areas. 
The major legal question concerned whether Article 9(3) has sufficient direct effect to enable 
an environmental organisation to derive a right of access to justice from this provision, at least 
in respect of a national decision which allows exceptions from an environmental regime 
imposed by the Habitat Directive.55  
                                                 
49 In this context, it may, however, be useful to remember that also Member States are parties of the Aarhus 
Convention so that they have to respect their provisions.  
50  Cf. to this issue also Appel, NuR 2011 (note 9), 414 (415).  
51  Cf. also in this direction e.g. Schlacke, NVwZ 2011 (note 51), 804 (805).  
52  Cf. the references of some of such rules in Meitz, NuR 2011 (note 9), 420 (421-422).  
53  Cf. III.1. 
54  ECJ, case C-240/09, Lesoochranarske, judgment of 8 march 2011.  
55  Directive 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ 1992 L 206, 7.  
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The Court accepted its competence to interpret Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention,56 but 
denied the direct effect of the provision on the basis that it does not contain any clear and 
precise obligation capable of directly regulating the legal position of individuals. This 
approach is not really surprising in view of the very open formulation of Article 9(3) of the 
Aarhus Convention.57 However, it was held that the national court must – in relation to 
species protected by EU law – interpret domestic law in a way which, to the fullest extent 
possible, is consistent with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, 
in order to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU environmental law. 
Therefore, the national law has to be interpreted in such a way as to enable an environmental 
protection organisation to challenge before a court a decision taken following administrative 
proceedings liable to be contrary to EU environmental law.  
Thus, if the dispute falls within the scope of EU law or if national law transposing EU law is 
concerned, the Court admits certain legal effects of the provisions of these international 
agreements for the Member States even if the conditions for direct effect are not fulfilled: 
Member States have to interpret their national law in a way that is in conformity with the 
relevant treaty provision. This judgment does not, however, alter the large margin of 
appreciation that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention confers to Member States. This is of 
particular importance in relation to access to justice for individuals since it can be subject to 
certain conditions even if it may not be totally excluded. As far as access to justice for 
environmental associations is concerned, the judgment seems to admit that under EU law this 
access may not be generally denied. This approach is far reaching since it obliges Member 
States to maintain or introduce access to justice for environmental organisations in respect of 
the possible breach of EU law or of national law transposing EU law.58 Such an obligation 
goes much further than access to justice in respect of the authorisation of certain potentially 
dangerous activities or projects; moreover, this approach of the Court partly fills the gap 
                                                 
56  Even though the EU has not transposed this provision into EU law. A dispute falls nevertheless within the 
scope of EU law when it relates to a field covered in a large measure by EU law what is the case at 
present since the dispute concerns species protected by the Habitat Directive. So, the Court deduces from 
the material relevance of the Habitat Directive that the EU has exercised its powers and that the dispute 
falls within the scope of EU law. Cf. to this aspect of the judgment Sabine Schlacke, Stärkung 
überindividuellen Rechtsschutzes zur Durchsetzung des Umweltrechts – zugleich Anmerkung zu EuGH, 
Urteil vom 8. März 2011 – Rs. C-240/09, ZUR 2011, 312 (313 et seq.).  
57  See, however, also the critical view of Ludwig Krämer, Comment on case C-240/09, JEEPL 2011, 445 
(447), who supports the view that direct effect should be admitted in cases Member States had not made 
use of their right to lay down conditions under which access to justice was possible.  
58  In this direction also the interpretation of the judgment of Schlacke, ZUR 2011 (note ), 312 (315-316). It 
has to be stressed in this context that Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention has be interpreted by the majority of 
legal literature, also by the author of this contribution, as being of rather few practical significance since it 
does not contain really precise standards as the access of justice is concerned. Cf. Astrid Epiney/Kaspar 
Sollberger Verwaltungsgerichtlicher Rechtsschutz in Umweltangelegenheiten, 2003, 173-174. The Court, 
however, now states that this provision requires an access to justice of environmental organisations.  
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created by the failure to transpose Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention within EU law,59 as 
it allows environmental organisations to indirectly challenge EU law.  
Finally, it must be stressed that the Aarhus Convention is binding on the EU and the Member 
States (Article 216(2) TFEU) so that the EU legislator must also comply with its 
requirements. Logically, this would appear to imply that EU environmental legislation should 
be rounded out by provisions concerning access to justice in conformity with the Aarhus 
Convention. The EU legislator could implement this requirement by adopting a sepcific 
horizontal directive (a proposal which has, to date, been refused by the Member States) or by 
ensuring that every secondary act on environmental law contains such provisions.60  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This contribution demonstrates that international environmental agreements form an integral 
part of EU law and may contribute in a decisive way to the effectiveness of their provisions. 
This heightened effectiveness is largely due to the characteristics of EU law that are also 
applicable to international agreements. As the example of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention illustrates, however, principles such as direct effect or the interpretation of EU 
and national law in conformity with international agreements, do not offer comprehensive 
solutions in all situations in which a transposition to the EU level is lacking: First, the 
conditions of direct effect are not always fulfilled and, furthermore, it may be difficult to 
determine if a provision of an international agreement satisfies these conditions. Second, the 
exact implications of an interpretation in conformity with EU law may also be subject to 
uncertainties. For these reasons, it is generally preferable to transpose obligations contained in 
international environmental agreements as fully as possible into EU law. For the time being, 
however, a careful reconsideration of the principles of direct effect and the interpretation of 
EU and national laws in conformity with international law as instruments for the enforcement 
of international obligations must be undertaken, especially at the national level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59  Vgl. the proposal of the commission, COM (2003) 624 final, which is, however, still blocked, cf. to this 
issue also Schlacke, ZUR 2011 (note 44), 312 (313). 
60  Cf. to this issue Krämer, JEEPL 2011 (note 45), 445 (448).  
